This walks through claims made by the Election Truth Alliance (ETA) in a single video by Nathan Taylor. Every claim below is attributed to that source. As ETA itself says: capability is not the same as evidence.
In early 2026, Ashley St. Clair — described in the video as Elon Musk's ex and the mother of his child — posted a TikTok describing private conversations she says she had with Musk during the 2024 campaign.
St. Clair posts a TikTok describing private conversations with Musk during the 2024 campaign.
She says Musk talked about "unleashing an anomaly in the matrix," using chess and space-laser metaphors.
He described having "a piece on the chess board they won't see."
Musk appeared to have near real-time access to election data on election night — and she questioned how.
Taylor frames St. Clair's account as the news hook for revisiting a set of older Musk quotes — not as proof of anything on its own.
ETA points to three Musk statements made around the 2024 election:
"We can take the Senate pretty easily... our little secret is having a big impact."
Vote-counting computers being "too easy" to hack — "to add just one line" — paired with: "if you're in space... quietly just do whatever we want."
A comment crediting his time in Pennsylvania, and his knowledge of "those vote counting computers," for the state's result.
Taylor's own framing: these quotes "carry more weight" considered alongside St. Clair's account — but he stops short of saying they prove anything by themselves.
Four reported facts, taken together, are what ETA points to as the reason to ask the question. None of them, on their own, says what happened in 2024.
This is the chain ETA lays out to explain why the question gets asked at all. Capability and confirmation are not the same thing — and as of this video, ETA says it has the first, not the second.
ETA cites a 2020–2021 finding on internet-connected systems, plus a separate New York State software review:
Taylor's conclusion, stated explicitly as a hypothetical: if someone had satellite or cellular access and exploited these vulnerabilities, votes could theoretically be altered. He frames this as a capability under discussion, not a confirmed event.
Taylor draws an analogy to the Volkswagen emissions scandal: vehicles passed standard regulatory testing, but an independent nonprofit's own road test caught a "defeat device" that standard testing had missed.
VW's vehicles passed official lab emissions tests. The same self-administered model is used for most county election audits today.
A nonprofit's real-world test caught a hidden "defeat device" the lab test missed — ETA's case for why independent, outside checks matter.
ETA's core argument is that county-level self-audits create a conflict of interest — the people checking the results have an incentive to overlook problems, or fix them quietly, rather than disclose them publicly.
ETA's answer borrows from a well-documented historical case: a system can be air-gapped during operation and still be reachable at the edges.
None of this is unique to voting machines — it's the same logic security researchers apply to any air-gapped system. ETA's point is narrower: the gap isn't as wide as "not connected to the internet" makes it sound.
Four county-level data points, plus one analytical method, are what ETA's active lawsuit is built on.
Every item above is an anomaly ETA is asking a court to look into — not a result a court, or anyone else, has yet confirmed was caused by tampering.
"There is not yet evidence that that is what happened."
— Nathan Taylor, ETA
The capability-vs-evidence distinction is repeated throughout the video: vulnerabilities and theoretical means are documented; an actual exploit is not.
ETA is recruiting volunteers in cybersecurity, IT, data forensics, and social media.
Visit electiontruthalliance.org